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Abstract. Sellers sometimes o¤er goods for sale under both a regular price and a discount
for group purchase if the consumer group reaches some minimum size. This selling prac-
tice, which we term interpersonal bundling, is analyzed in a general framework of product
bundling. We characterize the optimal prices and bundle size by a monopoly seller, and
explain why interpersonal bundling is a protable strategy in response to demand uncer-
tainty. We also discuss other strategic considerations in formulating this selling strategy.
Our analysis provides su¢ cient conditions for interpersonal bundling to dominate separate
selling, and o¤ers insights on how to enhance its prot advantage.
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1. INTRODUCTION
This paper studies a form of product bundling where a good is o¤ered for sale under
both a regular price and a discount for group purchase if the consumer group reaches some
minimum size the bundle size. The dening characteristic of this selling format is that the
purchase of the bundle is made by di¤erent consumers and hence we term it interpersonal
bundling rather than by a single consumer as under traditional mixed bundling.1
Interpersonal bundling is a widely observed selling practice. In many markets and for
many goods, multiple consumers may form a purchase group to qualify for a group dis-
count, as, for example, when buying tickets for a concert, purchasing a tour, or dining
at a restaurant.2 In recent years, many Internet sites have emerged that allow sellers to
o¤er interpersonal bundling, where consumers purchasing with group coupons receive sub-
stantial discounts when the minimum group size is reached. Launched in November 2008,
Groupon was a pioneer in this selling format on the Internet, and it exceeded a billion
dollars in revenue in just its third year of operation (Levin, 2012).3 Despite its popularity,
the pricing and protability of interpersonal bundling have not been studied in a general
bundling framework. How should a seller optimally choose prices and bundle size under
interpersonal bundling? When will interpersonal bundling be more protable than separate
selling?4 What determine the size of its prot advantage? How does this selling format
1Mixed bundling refers to o¤ering goods for sale both as a package and as individual components.
2Miller Farms, a local family farm in Colorado, runs the Fall Harvest Festival each year. In 2012, a
customer is charged $15 to participate in the Festival and pick up vegetables to take home. For a group of
10 or more, the price per person is lowered to $13.
3Many other group buying websites o¤er variants of interpersonal bundling, including Livingsocial, where
a consumer receives a free deal if she gets three people buy the product. There are numerous interpersonal
bundling sites around the global, such as uBuyiBuy, Gaopeng, and Lashou in Asia, MyCityDeal in Europe,
Downtown Colombia in South America, and Spreets in Australia.
4Here, separate selling means o¤ering a good for sale under a single unit price to all consumers, whereas
a pure bundle would consist of multiple units of the same good under a unit price for group purchase.
The recent economics literature has investigated product bundling that is di¤erent from traditional mixed
bundling. See, for example, the study of bundle size pricing by Chu, Leslie, and Sorensen (2011), and of
inter-rm bundling by Gans and King (2006) and Armstrong (2012).
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a¤ect consumers and welfare? We provide some answers to these questions in this study.
The literature on product bundling has found that mixed bundling often is more protable
than separate selling through two main mechanisms: segmenting consumer population to
facilitate price discrimination and reducing the dispersion of consumer values to extract
consumer surplus (e.g., Adams and Yellen 1976; Schmalensee, 1984; Long, 1984; McAfee,
McMillan, and Whinston 1989; and Chen and Riordan, 2011).5 This paper will explore an
alternative motive for bundling: as a protable strategy in response to demand uncertainty.
While this motive can also arise when each bundle is purchased by an individual consumer,6
it is especially relevant and important for interpersonal bundling.
We start with a stylized model where a monopolist sells to a consumer population with
an uncertain number of low-value consumers and possibly also an uncertain number of
high-value consumers. Under separate selling, the seller may optimally pursue either a
high-price strategy targeting only the high-value consumers, or a low-price strategy that
will also attract low-value consumers. The low price will be protable only if it results in
a su¢ ciently high sales volume if the number of low-value consumers is su¢ ciently large.
However, because price is set before the uncertainty is resolved, setting a single price is
generally not optimal. By o¤ering the good for sale under interpersonal bundling, the low
price will become e¤ective only if it will indeed lead to a su¢ ciently high increase in sales,
while the high price will prevail when the number of low-value consumers turns out to be
relatively small. Thus, interpersonal bundling potentially enables the seller to use optimal
option pricing under uncertain demand, leading to higher prot than separate selling.
Our analysis of the basic model leads to several interesting results. After characteriz-
ing the optimal prices and bundle size, we provide a su¢ cient condition for interpersonal
5 In a standard model of two goods, some consumers may value one good highly but another very little,
while others may value two goods together relatively highly, and values for the bundle may be less dispersed
than values for individual goods. By charging the former (who purchase only a single unit) a higher price
and the latter a bundle discount, mixed bundling generally leads to higher prot than separate selling.
6Under standard mixed bundling with two goods, there can be uncertainties on each individual consumers
valuation for the two goods, and mixed bundling can thus be viewed as a form of option pricing, where a
consumer will obtain the bundle discount only if she has su¢ ciently high demand for both goods.
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bundling to dominate separate selling. Remarkably, this condition is invariant to the func-
tional forms of the distributions of consumer numbers. We also show how the prot di¤er-
ence between interpersonal bundling and separate selling may vary with parameter values
of the market environment, and provide simple conditions for the former to have higher or
lower welfare than the latter. Moreover, in the simple setting of the basic model, we nd
that interpersonal bundling is in fact an optimal selling scheme among all selling mecha-
nisms that may depend on realized aggregate demand. Our analysis also explores alternative
assumptions on the distributions of consumer values.
We further present two variants of the basic model to explore how a seller may incorporate
additional strategic considerations in designing a bundle, with explicit modeling of the
decision process of individual consumers. In the rst variant, we allow the possibility
that some consumers are initially uninformed about the existence of the sellers product.
Then, in order to qualify for the discount available only when the minimum bundle size
is reached, informed consumers may take (costly) actions to transmit product information
to the uninformed, and the seller can exploit this incentive when strategically setting the
bundle size. Interpersonal bundling can thus increase the sellers prot by facilitating the
dissemination of product information. While this informational role of group buying has
also been identied and explored in Jing and Xie (2011), their model focuses on exogenously
xed group size and known demand. By contrast, bundle size is a key decision variable in
our analysis of interpersonal bundling, and demand uncertainty is a central feature of our
model that interacts with the consideration for information transmission.
Our second variant of the basic model brings in the possibility that high-value consumers
need to incur transaction costs to sign up for group purchase. The seller may then be
able to partially segment the consumer population when practicing interpersonal bundling,
pushing high-value consumers with high sign-up costs to purchase at the regular price while
attracting low-value consumers with the bundle discount. To allow for a richer modeling of
consumersdecision process, we consider two forms of interpersonal bundling in a two-period
setting, in parallel to Hu, Shi and Wu (2013)s study of two group-buying mechanisms:
a simultaneous format where the seller does not inform period-2 consumers how many
3
buyers signed up in period 1, and a sequential format where the seller does. Hu, Shi and
Wu (2013) nd that the seller prefers the sequential mechanism, because it encourages
consumer participation by removing their uncertainty in period 2, which leads to higher
group formation rates. Interestingly, in our model the seller, who aims to maximize prot,
may instead prefer the simultaneous format. This is because the simultaneous format does
not remove uncertainty to the high-value consumers, which facilitates price discrimination
by discouraging the high-value consumers from obtaining the bundle discount.7
In addition to o¤ering a new perspective on product bundling, this paper is also closely
related to the literature on pricing under demand uncertainty. Dana (2001), for example,
studies a model in which demand can be either high or low. He nds that a monopolist
optimally o¤ers two prices, with only a limited quantity o¤ered under a low price, which
is set for the low demand state. A high price then allows the rm to extract additional
consumer surplus when demand turns out to be high, in which case the limited quantity
available at the low price will sell out so that some high-priced units will be purchased.
Anand and Aron (2003), in an early study of web-based group buying, also consider a model
with either a high or a low demand regime, represented by two linear demand functions.
They demonstrate that group buying may enable the seller to set price-quantity schedules
that optimize revenue under each demand regime, and that the protability of group buying
relative to posted pricing depends on whether the two linear demand functions are parallel
or intersecting.8 Our paper di¤ers by adopting an entirely di¤erent analytical approach,
capturing the group buying problem in a general bundling framework. Additionally, we
are concerned with the uncertainty of a di¤erent nature: there are both high- and low-
value consumers, and the uncertainty is over their respective numbers. We believe that
7 In advertising group purchase deals, Groupon informs potential buyers how many consumers have already
signed up for a deal, consistent with the strategy of maximizing deal success rates (Hu, Shi, Wu, 2013). As
we shall further discuss later, some of the practices by Groupon, in its role as an intermediary o¤ering
interpersonal bundling, may not be in the best interest of sellers.
8Also related are Gale and Holmes (1992, 1993), who study how a monopolist may use advance purchase
discounts to allocate capacity more e¢ ciently in the presence of demand uncertainty. See also Dana (1998)
for a related analysis in competitive markets.
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this formulation is a plausible, albeit simplied, description of the market environment
faced by many rms, and it is especially relevant for interpersonal bundling. Furthermore,
as discussed above, our analysis leads to interesting new results on the protability and
optimal design of interpersonal bundling. Our paper thus contributes to the literatures
on product bundling, on pricing under demand uncertainty, and, more generally, on the
economics and management of marketing.
In the rest of the paper, we conduct our core analysis with respect to the basic model in
section 2, study the two variants of the basic model in section 3, and conclude in section 4.
2. DEMAND UNCERTAINTY AND INTERPERSONAL BUNDLING
2.1 Basic Model
A monopolist o¤ers a product for sale. There are two types of consumers, high-value
and low-value, whose product valuations are respectively H and L; with H > L > 0: A
consumers type is her private information, and each consumer desires to purchase at most
one unit. The numbers of low- and high-value consumers are respectively x and y; which
are realizations of random variables X and Y that have joint distribution function G (x; y)
on support [ax; bx] [ay; by] ; where 0  ax < bx and 0  ay  by: The marginal distribution
function of X is F (x) ; with density function f (x) > 0 on [ax; bx] : Production cost is
normalized to zero, and the rm maximizes expected prot.
Let x and y be the expected number of low- and high-value consumers, respectively. Then
x =
Z bx
ax
xdF (x) ; y =
Z bx
ax
Z by
ay
ydG (x; y) : (1)
We allow the possibility that y = y is a constant; in which case G (x; y) degenerates to
F (x) :9
As a benchmark, consider the case of separate selling where the rm posts a single unit
price to all consumers. Then, prot is higher under p = H if Hy > L (x+ y) and it is higher
under p = L if Hy < L (x+ y) : It follows that the optimal price and the corresponding
9The uncertainty in x is essential for our analysis and is maintained throughout the paper.
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prot are, respectively:10
ps =
8<: H if x 
 
H
L   1

y
L if x >
 
H
L   1

y
; s =
8<: Hy if x 
 
H
L   1

y
L (x+ y) if x >
 
H
L   1

y
: (2)
Therefore, if the expected number of low-value consumers (x) is small, the rm will only sell
to the high-value consumers at ps = H; otherwise, it will sell to all consumers at ps = L.
Under interpersonal bundling, the rm sets a stand-alone unit price p; a discounted unit
price under group purchase q  p; and a minimum group size m for the discounted price to
take e¤ect (i.e., for the deal to be on). Each consumer can separately purchase the good at
price p; but consumers who sign up for group purchase can buy at the discounted price q if
and only if there are M ( m) consumers in the group: Notice that if q = p; then bundling
is equivalent to separate selling under price p: In our basic model, we assume that there is
no transaction cost for a consumer to use the group coupon, which implies that if q < p, all
consumers will attempt to purchase at the discounted bundle price. Thus, bundled selling
with (p; q;m) is equivalent to separate selling with price q if m  ax + ay; and to separate
selling with price p if m  bx + by:
2.2 Protability of Interpersonal Bundling
Under bundling, with (p; q;m) ; all consumers will purchase at price q if x + y  m and
q  L; whereas when x + y < m only high-value consumers will purchase at price p if
L < p  H: The rms problem is to maximize (expected) prot:
max
qL<pH;m
 (p; q;m) = q
Z Z
x+ym
(x+ y) dG (x; y) + p
Z Z
x+y<m
ydG (x; y) : (3)
Since  (p; q;m) weakly increases in p and q for any m; the optimal p and q that maximize
 (p; q;m) are p = H and q = L: Hence the rms maximum prot under bundling and
the optimal (minimum) bundle size are
  max
m
 (H;L;m) ; m = arg max
m
 (H;L;m) : (4)
10For ease of exposition, when prot is the same under p = H and p = L; we assume ps = H:
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Notice thatm can be set low enough so that it is not a constraint, or high enough so that the
minimum group size can never be reached. In particular,  (H;L; ax + ay) = L (x+ y) and
 (H;L; bx + by) = Hy; which implies   s: Thus, same as mixed bundling, interpersonal
bundling will always be at least as protable as separate selling. We are, however, interested
in when interpersonal bundling is more protable than separate selling, and how large its
prot advantage is. Condition (A1) below provides a su¢ cient condition for  > s:
1 +
ax
ay

<
H
L
<

1 +
bx
by

: (A1)
Proposition 1 Interpersonal bundling is always at least as protable as separate pricing,
and it is more protable than separate selling if condition (A1) holds.
Proof. We show that under (A1) interpersonal bundling is more protable than separate
selling whether L (x+ y)  Hy or L (x+ y) > Hy:
(i) If L (x+ y)  Hy; s = Hy under separate selling; and, if in addition Hby <
L (bx + by) ; then for "  12
 
bx + by   HL by

> 0;
   (H;L; bx + by   ") =
Z Z
x+ybx+by "
[L (x+ y) Hy] dG (x; y) +Hy

Z Z
x+ybx+by "
[L (bx + by   ") Hy] dG (x; y) +Hy > H y = s:
(The rst inequality above is due to revealed preference, the second to x+y  bx+by "; and
the last to L (bx + by   ") Hy = 12 (L (bx + by +Hby)) Hy > 12L (bx + by  Hby) > 0:)
(ii) If L (x+ y) > H y; s = L (x+ y) under separate selling; and, if in addition Hay >
L (ax + ay) ; then for "  12

H
L ay   (ax + ay)

> 0;
   (H;L; ax + ay + ") = L (x+ y) +
Z Z
x+y<ax+ay+"
[Hy   L (x+ y)] dG (x; y)
> L (x+ y) +
Z Z
x+y<ax+ay+"
[Hy   L (ax + ay + ")] dG (x; y) > L (x+ y) = s:
The proof of Proposition 1 uses simple arguments that start from the optimal prices under
separate selling: if ps = H; prot can be increased by keeping the regular price but adding
7
a group bundle with unit price L and a minimum size that is slightly lower than bx+by (the
maximum possible total number of consumers); if ps = L; prot can be increased by rasing
the regular price to H and adding a bundle with unit price L and a minimum size that is
slightly higher than ax + ay (the minimum possible total number of consumers). Condition
(A1), which requires byH < (bx + by)L and (ax + ay)L < ayH; ensures that these changes
starting from separate selling will indeed strictly increase prot. This condition is thus
invariant to the functional form of the joint distribution of X and Y; depending only on
the upper and lower limits of the support for the distribution: It holds if the H=L ratio
is relatively large compared to ax=ay but small compared to bx=by. Intuitively, when (A1)
holds, prot can be higher either with high price (H) or with low price (L); depending
on the demand realization. Interpersonal bundling allows the rm to sell at the low price
only if prot is higher under the low price otherwise the high price will prevail, thereby
assuring a higher prot than separate selling.11
In many situations where group coupons are issued by sellers such as restaurants and hair
salons, H could be considered as the regular price at which the seller has less uncertainty
about the number of consumers. Thus the di¤erence between ay and by tends to be relatively
small: On the other hand, there might be more uncertainty about the number of consumers
who will purchase at the sale price L; so the di¤erence between ax and bx tends to be
relatively large. In such situations, condition (A1) is likely satised.12
To illustrate our result and to make explicit prot comparisons, consider the example
below:
Example 1 Suppose that X and Y are independently and uniformly distributed on [0; 3]
and [1; 2] ; respectively: Then, x = y = 32 ; p
s = H if H  2L; ps = L if H < 2L; and (A1)
11 If H=L is too small, it may be optimal always to sell at ps = L; so the option to sell at alternative prices
under interpersonal bundling has no value. Likewise, if H=L is too large, it could be optimal always to sell
at ps = H; which would then achieve the same prot as interpersonal bundling. Notice that if ax = 0; then
(A1) becomes H < L (1 + bx=by) and bundling is always more protable than charging ps = L:
12We may view interpersonal bundling as allowing the seller to experiment with a lower price that will
prevail only when the number of purchasing consumers reaches a minimum size, or only when it is more
protable than the regular price.
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holds if H < 52L: Under interpersonal bundling,
 (H;L;m)  L
Z 2
maxf1;m 3g
Z 3
maxfm y;0g
(x+ y)
1
3
dxdy+H
Z minfm;2g
1
Z minfm y;3g
0
y
1
3
dxdy:
Setting @ (H;L;m) =@m = 0; we nd the optimal (minimum) bundle size as
m =
8>>><>>>:
H
2L H ; with 
 > s if H  43L
3
2
H
L ; with 
 > s if 43L < H < 2:6L
 5; with  = s if 2:6L  H
:
For instance, if L = 1 and H = 2; then m = 3 and  = 3: 3333 > s = 3; so interpersonal
bundling increases (expected) prot by about 11%:
Several observations can be made in Example 1. First, condition (A1) is su¢ cient, but
not necessary, for the protability of interpersonal bundling. In Example 1, while (A1)
holds for H < 2:5L; bundling is also protable when H 2 [2:5L; 2:6L):
Second, (A1) is fairly tight as a su¢ cient condition. When H  2:6L; interpersonal
bundling is no longer protable. In this case, 32
H
L  32 (2:6) = 3: 9: However, for any m 2 [3:
9; 5); the expected prot under x+y  m; in which case all sales will occur at the discounted
price L; is lower than the expected prot under separate selling. Therefore, it is optimal for
the seller not to o¤er the bundle, which is equivalent to setting a su¢ ciently large bundle
size (m  5).
Third, when interpersonal bundling is protable, m increases in H but decreases in L:
A marginal increase in m reduces the probability that the sale will occur at the low price
(with a large volume) and raises the probability that the sale will occur at the high price.
Thus, m; which balances these two e¤ects, increases with the high price and decreases with
the low price. Put di¤erently, a higher H (or a lower L) makes sales under the stand-alone
price H relatively more protable, reducing the benet of selling at the bundle discount.
Consequently the optimal (minimum) bundle size with which the discount price will become
e¤ective is larger.
We now turn to the question of how the advantage of interpersonal bundling, relative to
separate selling, may vary with the market environment. We rst consider how the ratio
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H=L; or the di¤erence between the reservation prices of the high- and low-value consumers,
a¤ects the relative protability of bundling.
Corollary 1 Suppose that (A1) holds and L is xed. Then,   s exhibits an inverted-U
shape with respect to changes in H; rst increasing and then decreasing, reaching maximum
at H =

1 + xy

L:
Proof. WhenH <

1 + xy

L;  s = maxm  (H;L;m) L (x+ y) : From (3),  (H;L;m)
increases in H for all interior m: Thus, if (A1) holds so that  > s, maxm  (H;L;m)
is also increasing in H; and so is    s: Similarly, when H 

1 + xy

L;    s =
maxm
R R
x+ym [L (x+ y) Hy] dG (x; y) ; which decreases in H.
When H=L is low (or high), the prot advantage of bundling is low relative to separate
selling, because selling at price L (or H) is often more protable than at price H (or L);
which implies that the option to sell at one of the two prices contingent on the realizations
of X + Y under bundling has very limited value. This option becomes more valuable when
H=L is at some intermediate level, implying more profound prot advantage of bundling.
We next consider how the dispersion of X a¤ects the prots under interpersonal bundling.
Intuitively, when X is more dispersed, demand is more uncertain and the advantage of
interpersonal bundling is larger. The result below shows that this is indeed the case under
some conditions, assuming that X and Y are independent with the (marginal) distribution
of Y being J (y) ; and comparing prots under two di¤erent distributions of X:
Following Johnson and Myatt (2006), we say that distribution F^ (x) is more dispersed
than F (x) if F^ (x) is a rotation of F (x) such that x ? x^ () F^ (x) 7 F (x) for some
rotation point x^: Under F^ (x) and F (x) ; respectively, let xF^ and xF be the expected values
of X; b^x and bx the upper limits of F^ and F; and m^ and m the optimal bundle sizes,
where b^x  bx and xF^  xF . Let the corresponding prots be ^ and  under bundling;
and ^s and s under separate selling.
Corollary 2 Suppose (A1) holds and F^ is a rotation of F such that: (i) Hy  L  y + xF^  ;
(ii) x^  m   by; and (iii)
R by
ay
[Lm  Hy]
h
F^ (m   y)  F (m   y)
i
dJ (y)  0: Then,
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^   ^s >    s; that is, the prot advantage of bundling relative to separate selling is
larger if X is more dispersed.
Proof. See the appendix.
Although the result seems intuitive, the comparison of prots under F^ (x) and F (x) turns
out to be subtle. Condition (i) ensures that ps = H under separate selling for both F^ (x) and
F (x) : Under condition (ii), F^ (x) < F (x) for x  m   y; so that more dispersion under
F^ leads to higher probabilities for higher realizations of x; and under (iii) this similarly
holds on average weighted by the density of Y: Together, conditions (i) and (iii) ensure that
unambiguous comparisons can be made: All three conditions can be easy to verify. For
instance, in Example 1, where F (x) = x3 ; these conditions are satised for any rotation
F^ (x) = x with  > 3 and H=L 2 [(3 + ) =3; 2.6); where m = 32 HL > 3 > by = 2; and
x^ = 0.
Finally, comparing consumer and social welfare under interpersonal bundling and separate
selling is straightforward in our simple setting. When ps = L; interpersonal bundling raises
expected price and lowers expected output, whereas the opposite is true when ps = H.
From Proposition 1, we can therefore state the following su¢ cient conditions for the welfare
e¤ects of interpersonal bundling:
Corollary 3 Suppose that (A1) holds. Interpersonal bundling increases consumer and so-
cial welfare if H  L

1 + xy

; but it reduces consumer and total welfare if H < L

1 + xy

:
Intuitively, interpersonal bundling has two e¤ects on consumer welfare. First, it may
facilitate more e¤ective extraction of the high-value consumerssurplus, which negatively
impacts consumer welfare. Second, it may expand output when demand from low-value
consumers is high, which positively impacts consumer welfare. This intuition is consistent
with what is in the classic bundling literature, but here we obtain transparent conditions
on when each e¤ect dominates (and total welfare happens to change in the same direction
as consumer welfare due to the same underlying output change): When H=L is relatively
high, low-value consumers will not be served under separate selling but may be served under
11
interpersonal bundling, and hence the latter leads to higher (expected) consumer and total
welfare; and the converse is true when H=L is relatively low.
2.3 Interpersonal Bundling as an Optimal Selling Scheme
We now further argue that, in our simple setting, interpersonal bundling is an optimal
selling scheme. Since all consumers are ex ante the same, we can consider mechanisms for
a representative consumer. From the revelation principle, we can limit our search for an
optimal selling scheme to direct mechanisms where the consumer is asked to report her
type  2 fH; Lg ; who will receive a unit of the good with probability  () by paying
p () ; 13 and truth reporting is optimal for the consumer. Given that there is a continuum of
consumers,  () and p () will depend on  and on some aggregate measure(s) of consumers.
We assume that a mechanism may depend on the realized aggregate demand, x + y; but
not on individual values of x and y: One possible motivation for this assumption is that x
and y are not separately veriable while x+ y potentially is. Under this assumption, which
we shall call the veriability restriction, a mechanism species f (; x+ y) ; p (; x+ y)g :
The seller chooses f (; x+ y) ; p (; x+ y)g to maximize
 =
Z Z
[xp (L; x+ y) (L; x+ y) + yp (H;x+ y) (H;x+ y)] dG (x; y) ; (5)
subject to individual rationality constraints
(L  p (L; x+ y)) (L; x+ y)  0; (6)
(H   p (H;x+ y)) (H;x+ y)  0; (7)
and incentive compatibility constraints
(L  p (L; x+ y)) (L; x+ y)  (L  p (H;x+ y)) (H;x+ y) ; (8)
(H   p (H;x+ y)) (H;x+ y)  (H   p (L; x+ y)) (L; x+ y) : (9)
13We can also allow a transfer payment when the consumer does not receive the good, but it would be
optimal for the seller to set this payment to zero.
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From standard arguments, p (L; x+ y) = L so that the low-value type receives no informa-
tion rents, and (8) holds with p (H;x+ y)  L: From (9), which holds in equality at the
optimum, and with p (L; x+ y) = L; we have
p (H;x+ y) (H;x+ y) = H (H;x+ y)  (H   L) (L; x+ y) : (10)
Thus (7) and (10) are the two remaining constraints. Substituting (10) into (5), with
p (L; x+ y) = L; we obtain
 =
Z Z
f[xL  y (H   L)] (L; x+ y) + yH (H;x+ y)g dG (x; y) ;
which increases in  (H;x+ y) : Since constraint (7) is not less likely satised with an
increase in ; it follows that  (H;x+ y) = 1 at the optimum. Then, subject to (7), the
seller chooses  (L; x+ y) to maximize
 =
Z Z
f(x+ y)L (L; x+ y) + yH [1   (L; x+ y)]g dG (x; y) :
Hence, the optimal solution must involve a cut-o¤value for x+y; m; such that  (L; x+ y) =
1 when x+ y  m and  (L; x+ y) = 0 when x+ y < m; 14 where
m = arg max
m
Z Z
x+ym
L (x+ y) dG (x; y) +
Z Z
x+y<m
HydG (x; y) ;
with p (H;x+ y) = L if  (L; x+ y) = 1 and p (H;x+ y) = H if  (L; x+ y) = 0: But this
is exactly optimal interpersonal bundling under (4). We have thus shown:
Proposition 2 Interpersonal bundling is an optimal selling scheme among all mechanisms
satisfying the veriability restriction.
Note that if Y is a constant and takes the value y, then m = HL y and interpersonal
bundling is an optimal selling scheme among all selling mechanisms, with no need for the
veriability restriction.
14 If mechanisms could depend on the realizations of x and y separately, then the optimal mechanism
would set  (L; x+ y) = 1 when (x+ y)L > yH and  (L; x+ y) = 0 when (x+ y)L  yH: Notice that
with a continuum of consumers, a single consumer cannot change the realizations of x or y by reporting or
not reporting her type.
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2.4 Continuous Distributions of Consumer Values
Our basic model assumes that the high- and low-value consumers have constant reserva-
tion pricesH and L; respectively. This allows us to illustrate our ideas in a most transparent
setting. Our analysis can be extended to situations where the product values of these two
types of consumers are vH and vL; which are realizations of continuous random variables.
To illustrate this, we assume that the number of lowvalue consumers, x; again follows
distribution F (x) ; and the number of high-value consumers is a given parameter a > 1.
Furthermore, vL; vH ; and x are independently and uniformly distributed on [0; 1] ; [0; a] ;
and [0; 2] ; respectively:15 Thus a higher a indicates a higher product valuation or higher
demand from the high-value consumers.
First, under separate selling, the rms expected prot is:
 (p) =
8<: p (a  p) if 1 < p  aR 2
0 p (x (1  p) + a  p) 12dx if 0  p  1
;
which is maximized if either p = a2 or p =
a+1
4 : Since 
 
a
2
    a+14  T 0 if a T p2 + 1; we
have ps = a2 if a >
p
2 + 1 and ps = a+14 if 1 < a 
p
2 + 1: It follows that
s =
8<: a
2
4 if a >
p
2 + 1
(a+1)2
8 if 1 < a 
p
2 + 1
:
Next, under interpersonal bundling, given (p; q;m) with q < p and m  0; consumers
whose value is at least q will purchase at price q if x (1  q) + a  q  m; or
x  m  a+ q
1  q : (11)
If inequality (11) does not hold, then no group purchase will occur and consumers can only
15Equivalently, we can relax the unit demand assumption and allow each of these two types of consumers
to have a downward-slopping demand curve. In particular, each lowvalue consumer has demand qL = 1 p;
and each high-value consumer has demand qH = a  p. Note that the number of each type of consumers is
a continuum.
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purchase at the regularprice p. Thus, the seller chooses (p; q;m) to maximize
 (p; q;m) =
q
Z 2
min
n
m a+q
1 q ;2
o x (1  q) + a  q
2
dx+ p
Z minnm a+q
1 q ;2
o
0
max fx (1  p) ; 0g+ a  p
2
dx:
We can now establish:
Proposition 3 For the variant of the basic model with continuous distributions of vH and
vL; interpersonal bundling dominates separate selling (i.e.,  > s) if and only if 1 < a <
p
3 + 1:
The proof of Proposition 3, formally presented in the appendix, starts with two ob-
servations linking prots under interpersonal bundling and under separate selling: (1)
 (p; ps; 0) = s for p > ps and (2)  (ps; q;m) = s for q < 1 and m = a + 2   3q;
where, under interpersonal bundling, all consumers purchase with bundle discount in case
(1) and no consumer qualies for the bundle discount in case (2). Di¤erentiating  (; ;m)
with respect to m; we can then show that, if 1 < a <
p
3 + 1;  is increasing in m at m = 0
in case (1) and decreasing in m at m = a+2 3q in case (2), so that interpersonal bundling
achieves higher prot than separate selling. Furthermore,  (p; q;m) is concave in m when
a >
p
2 + 1; which, together with  increasing at m = a+ 2  3q if a  p3 + 1; leads to the
conclusion that  = s if a  p3 + 1.
Table 1 below contains some comparisons for three values of a:
Table 1
p q m  s 
 s
s
a = 2 1 0:728 71 1: 372 3 1: 130 9 1: 125 0:5%
a = 2:4 1: 2 0:778 30 1: 850 2 1: 480 5 1: 44 2:8%
a = 2:7 1: 35 0:788 60 2: 311 1 1: 823 1: 822 5 0:03%
Apparently, in this simple variant of the basic model, interpersonal bundling achieves
higher prot than separate selling if the value of a is in an intermediate range, and the
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prot advantage,  s; exhibits an inverted-U shape with respect to changes in a: These
ndings are analogous to those in Proposition 1 and Corollary 1 of the basic model.
3. INFORMATION DISSEMINATION AND PRICE DISCRIMINATION
Our basic model has focused on the role of uncertain demand in the protability of
interpersonal bundling. Demand uncertainty is a common phenomenon in many markets,
and our analysis demonstrates how rms can use this selling strategy to increase prot in
such market environments. In this section, we discuss how a seller may incorporate two
additional strategic considerations in the design of interpersonal bundling to enhance its
protability, in two variants of the basic model.
3.1 Dissemination of Product Information
The existence of a sellers product may be known to some consumers but unknown to
others. In order to achieve the group size to qualify for the low (bundle) price, an informed
potential buyer may have the incentive to transmit the information about the sale to other
consumers. A seller should take this incentive into account in its optimal design of the
bundle. To formalize this idea in a simple setting, we consider a variant of the basic model
by assuming that the number of high-value consumers is initially a given number n  1;
and each of them (i = 1; :::; n) can make an e¤ort in order to inform a set of k > 0
high-value consumers who are initially unaware of the sellers product and prices.16 Dene
set N  fi : i = 1; :::; ng : Each i 2 N succeeds in transmitting the information to the k
uninformed consumers with probability i at a personal cost C (i) ; where C
0 () > 0 with
C 0 (0) ! 0; C 00 ()  0; and the k uninformed consumers become informed if at least one
16Unlike in Section 2, the number of initial high-value consumers is now an integer. This avoids the problem
that no consumer is willing to incur the information transmission cost when the number is a continuum: For
convenience, we assume that the initially uninformed consumers also are all of the high-value type.
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i 2 N succeeds. Thus, the number of high-value consumers is potentially
y =
8<: n+ k with probability 1 ni=1 (1  i)n with probability ni=1 (1  i) :
Other aspects of the model are the same as the basic model in Section 2. In particular, all
low-value consumers are informed about the sellers product and price(s), and their num-
ber, x; is the realization of random variable X that has distribution F (x) : The reservation
prices of the high- and low-value consumers are again H and L; respectively. Under sep-
arate selling, informed consumers have no incentive to incur the cost to transmit product
information to uninformed consumers. Hence ps = L and s = L (n+ x) if L (n+ x) > Hn;
whereas ps = H and s = Hn if L (n+ x)  Hn:
Under interpersonal bundling, the seller rst posts (p; q;m) ; after which all i 2 N simul-
taneously choose i: Both x and y are then realized, and possible purchases are made. For
convenience, we again treat m as a continuous number, and without loss of generality, we
can conne our search for the optimal (p; q;m) to q  L < p  H:
We consider a symmetric equilibrium where each i 2 N chooses the same : Given
(p; q;m) ; and all other high-value consumerschoice ~; consumer i chooses her i to maxi-
mize her expected surplus:
U

jm; ~

= (H   q)Pr (X + Y  m) + (H   p)Pr (X + Y < m)  C () ;
where Pr(X + Y  m) =
[1  F (m  n  k)]

1 

1  ~
n 1
(1  )

+ (1  F (m  n))

1  ~
n 1
(1  ) :
In equilibrium, ~ = , where  is the equilibrium choice of all consumers, and we denote
the equilibrium bundle by (p; q;m) :
Notice that interpersonal bundling now can increase prot for two distinct reasons. First,
as a protable pricing strategy under uncertainty, it increases prot even if i = 0 for all i
(in which case uninformed consumers do not learn about the product information). From
Proposition 1 and (A1), this is ensured if
1 +
ax
n

<
H
L
<

1 +
bx
n

: (A1)
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Second, interpersonal bundling can motivate consumers to transmit product information
to the uninformed, or to choose i > 0 at a personal cost, in hope of reaching the minimum
bundle size so that the discount will be e¤ective. Our next result, which provides a su¢ cient
condition for higher prots under interpersonal bundling with the additional channel of
encouraging information transmission to expand demand (i.e., in equilibrium i = 
 > 0),
refers to the following condition

1 +
ax
n

<
H
L


1 +
bx
n+ k

: (A2)
Note that (A2), which implies the weaker condition (A1), similarly holds if H=L is in an
intermediate range.
Proposition 4 Suppose that (A2) holds. Then, interpersonal bundling has higher prot
than separate selling with  > 0; p = H; and m 2 (n+ ax; n+ k + bx) :
Proof. See the appendix.
Since the discount price can be valid only if the minimum bundle size is reached, the
informed consumers have the incentive to transmit costly product information to the un-
informed, hoping that more consumers will join the group purchase. As is shown in the
proof for the symmetric equilibrium contained in the appendix, it is indeed optimal for each
informed consumer to choose ; given that other informed consumers will do the same.
Notice that the optimal bundle size, m; is now chosen also to provide the incentive for
, in addition to responding optimally to demand uncertainty. Therefore, interpersonal
bundling also provides a mechanism to expand market demand.
To illustrate, consider the next example:
Example 2 Suppose that n = 2; k = 1; C () = 12
2; F (x) = x3 for x 2 [0; 3] ; and L <
H < 52L: Then, condition (A1) is satised, which is su¢ cient for interpersonal bundling
to increase prot. With L = 1; Table 2 below lists the equilibrium interpersonal bundle and
the prot comparisons with separate selling.
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Table 2
p q m   s 
 s
s
H = 2 2 1 4: 875 0:25 4: 805 4 10%
H = 1:8 1:8 1 4: 278 0:21 4: 377 3:6 22%
H = 1:5 1:5 1 3:398 0:143 3:914 3:5 12%
As in Example 1, given L; m is higher for higher H: Furthermore,  is also higher for
higher H; directly because of the larger bundle discount (H  L), and indirectly because of
the higher bundle size (m):
3.2 Price Discrimination
To obtain the bundle discount under interpersonal bundling, a consumer may need to
incur transaction costs to sign up for group purchase. If high-value consumers have higher
time costs, they are less likely to participate. Interpersonal bundling can thus be a device for
price discrimination, as in the textbook example of price discrimination through coupons.
With bundling, however, there is an additional instrument to screen the buyers: Through
the choice of the (minimum) bundle size that may not be reached due to uncertainty, the
seller can further discourage high-value consumers from attempting to receive the bundle
discount.
To illustrate how a seller can incorporate the possibility of price discrimination in bundle
design, consider another variant of the basic model, where the low-value consumers have
no cost to participate in group purchase, but the high-value consumers incur a transaction
cost t to do so. Assume that t is distributed on [t; t] with p.d.f.  (t) > 0; c.d.f.  (t) ;
and 0  t < t: The number of low-value consumers is again x with cumulative distribution
function F (x) ; while the mass of high-value consumers is normalized to 1. As in the basic
model, these two types of consumers value the product respectively at L and H: Thus,
under separate selling, ps = H = s if H  L (x+ 1) ; whereas ps = L and s = L (x+ 1)
if H < L (x+ 1) :
As in the basic model, the game under interpersonal bundling proceeds as follows: First,
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the seller o¤ers (p; q;m) : Second, the number of low-value consumers and the private t for
each high-value consumer are realized. Third, consumers choose whether to sign up for
group purchase. Fourth, the total number of consumers who sign up becomes known. If
this number exceeds m; each group member pays q while consumers who have not signed
up will pay p; otherwise, all consumers are charged regular price p.
In order to analyze price discrimination under alternative forms of interpersonal bundling,
we further assume that consumers can sign up for group purchase possibly in two periods,
1, or 2. (Neither the seller nor consumers discount time.) Under the simultaneous format,
at the beginning of period 2 the seller does not reveal how many consumers signed up in the
rst period, whereas under the sequential format the rm does. Hence, with the former all
consumers e¤ectively make sign-up decisions simultaneously, whereas with the latter they
make sign-up decisions sequentially.
Simultaneous Format
In this case, a high-value consumer, if she wishes to participate in the group purchase,
needs to incur t before it becomes known how many low-value consumers have signed up
for group purchase, or what the realization of x is (it is optimal for all low-value consumers
to sign up for group coupon since they incur no sign-up cost). Suppose that there is some
t 2 [0; t] that solves
H   p =
Z
x+(t)m
(H   q) f (x) dx+
Z
x+(t)<m
(H   p) f (x) dx  t: (12)
Then, there will be an equilibrium where all low-value consumers sign up for group purchase,
and a high-value consumer will sign up if and only if t  t:17 We shall focus on this
equilibrium.18 Rearranging (12), we obtain
t = (p  q) [1  F (m   (t))] : (13)
17Equation (12) says that the marginal high-value consumer with t will just be willing to sign up; given
(p; q;m) and given the equilibrium behavior of all other consumers.
18There can also be a trivial equilibrium where no one signs up for the group coupon, due to there being
a continuum of consumers.
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The sellers problem is, with t = t (p; q;m) ; to maximize
 (p; q;m) =
Z bx
m (t)
[q (x+  (t)) + p (1   (t))] f (x) dx+ p
Z m (t)
ax
f (x) dx (14)
subject to q  L; L  p  H; ax  m    (t)  bx: The solution to (14) denes the
equilibrium (p; q;m) :
The seller can increase its prot by charging a lower price to the low-value consumers
(a price no higher than L) and a higher price to the high-value consumers (as high as H):
With regular price p and discounted bundle price q, a high-value consumer may nevertheless
prefer to purchase at p; because she incurs sign-up cost t for group purchase and she may
lose t without receiving the bundle discount if the minimum bundle size is not reached.
Hence, a higher m will reduce the incentive of a high-value consumer to engage in group
purchase. Interpersonal bundling may thus price discriminate more e¤ectively both than
traditional coupons and than usual mixed bundling.
A higher m; however, can hurt the seller if the sales to the low-value consumers do not
materialize. This should also be taken into account when the seller chooses its optimal
m. Notice that any q below L will lower the sellers prot when the good is sold at a
discount and will also make participating in group purchase more attractive to the high
value consumers. Thus it is optimal for the seller to set q = L: On the other hand, a higher
p may have the opposing e¤ects of increasing the prot from the high-value consumers
purchasing at the regular price but also making purchasing at the bundle discount more
attractive. Consequently, the optimal value of p is determined jointly with m: Because
 (H;L; ax)   (L;L;m) for any m; to search for the optimal (p; m) we can limit our
attention to situations where p > L:
Again denote the sellers equilibrium prot under interpersonal bundling by : To derive
a su¢ cient condition under which  > s; we utilize the condition below
(i) t > H   L; (ii) Lx > (H   L)  (H   L) : (A3)
Since p  H; part (i) in (A3) ensures that some high-value consumers will not incur t for
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the bundle discount, and, from (14),
 (H;L; ax) = L [x+  (H   L)] +H [1   (H   L)] > L (x+ 1) = sjps=L ;
so that bundling with (p; q;m) = (H;L; ax) is always more protable than separate selling
with ps = L: Moreover, condition (ii) in (A3) ensures that
 (H;L; ax) = L [x+  (H   L)] H (H   L) +H > H = sjps=H ;
so that bundling with (p; q;m) = (H;L; ax) is also always more protable than separate
selling with ps = H: Therefore, since ps = L or H; under condition (A3) it must be true
that    (H;L; ax) > s and p > L = q. We have therefore established:
Proposition 5 Suppose that condition (A3) is satised. Then, the sellers prot is higher
under interpersonal bundling than under separate selling with p > L = q.
We illustrate the result with the following example:
Example 3 Assume that  (t) = 1 on [0; 1] ; f (x) = 12 on [0; 2] ; and L = 1: For dif-
ferent values of H; Table 3 below lists the equilibrium interpersonal bundle and the prot
comparisons with separate selling.
Table 3
p q m t  s    s  ss
H = 2:5 2:5 1 1:846 0:462 2:808 2:5 0:308 12%
H = 2 2 1 1:5 0:5 2:5 2 0:5 25%
H = 1:5 1:5 1 0:8 0:4 2:3 2 0:3 15%
Several observations can be made from Table 3. First,  > s for all H 2 f1:5; 2; 2:5g ;
and for protable interpersonal bundling, (A3) is su¢ cient but not necessary. For instance,
when H = 2:5; (A3) is not satised but m > ax; t < t; and  > s: Second, m increases
in p; so as to discourage the high-value consumers from using the group coupon. Third,
similarly as in the basic model,    s varies non-monotonically as H changes; reaching
maximum when H is some intermediate value:
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Sequential Format
Now consider the sequential format, where at the beginning of period 2 it becomes public
information how many consumers signed up in the rst period. Recall that the seller rst
o¤ers (p; q;m) : Since a low-value consumer has no cost to sign up, it is optimal for her to
do so in the rst period. Therefore in equilibrium all low-value consumers sign up in period
1 and the number of low-value consumers is then publicly known.19
Next consider the sign-up decision of high-value consumers, for whom it is optimal to
wait until the beginning of period 2 to make the choice, after learning the realization of the
number of low-value consumers. Suppose for a moment that, in equilibrium, depending on
the realization of x, there exists a cuto¤ value t (x) such that only high-value consumers
with t  t will sign up for group purchase. Given such a strategy by other consumers,
consider the incentive of a high-value consumer with sign-up cost t: She chooses to sign up
only if this leads to a (weakly) higher surplus for her and if a group discount is expected to
be o¤ered:
H   q   t  H   p and x+  (t)  m:
Hence the sign-up cost of the marginal high-value consumer is t = p   q. It follows that,
if x  x^, it is optimal for any high-value consumer with t  t to sign up given that the
others will do the same, where
t = p  q and x^ = m   (p  q) ; (15)
and the group size will be reached. Therefore, under the sequential format, there is indeed
an equilibrium, where the seller chooses (p; q;m) optimally, low-value consumers will sign
up in the rst period, and: (i) if x  x^; then high-value consumers with t  t will sign up
in the second period and m will be reached, so that group participants will pay discounted
19Again, with a continuum of low-value consumers, this may not be the only equilibrium, but it is the
natural one to focus on, because low-value consumers cannot lose from signing up early, and may possibly
gain if their action encourages high-value consumers to sign up in period 2 so that the group discount will
more likely be available.
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price q while non-participants (high-value consumers with t > t) will pay regular price p;
(ii) if x < x^; no high-value consumers will sign up and only regular price p prevails.
Comparing (15) with (13), we have t > t: That is, more high-value consumers will
sign up for group purchase under the sequential than under the simultaneous format of
interpersonal bundling. This implies that, for the same bundle, group purchases will occur
more often under the sequential format. The intuition behind this nding, as in Hu, Shi,
and Wu (2013), is that the sequential format removes the uncertainty faced by period-2
consumers about the number of participating consumers in period 1, which makes period-2
consumers more willing to sign up. Although our model and analysis di¤er from those in
Hu, Shi, and Wu (2013),20 our nding supports their conclusion that the sequential group-
buying mechanism will lead to higher deal success rates. While this implies that a seller
would prefer the sequential format if, as they assume, it aims to maximize the deal success
rates, in our model the seller, whose objective is to maximize prot, may actually prefer
the simultaneous format.
To see that prot can be higher under simultaneous than under sequential interpersonal
bundling, we notice that the sellers prot function for the sequential format can be obtained
by using the prot expression for the simultaneous format in (14) but replacing t with t:
 (p; q;m) =
Z bx
m (t)
[q (x+  (t)) + p (1   (t))] f (x) dx+ p
Z m (t)
ax
f (x) dx:
(16)
While a complete comparison of prots under the two formats is rather complicated and
beyond the scope of our paper, we demonstrate that prot can be higher in the simultaneous
format with the following example, which has the same assumptions as example 3:
Example 4 Assume that  (t) = 1 on [0; 1] ; f (x) = 12 on [0; 2] ; and L = 1: For di¤er-
ent values of H; 21 Table 4 compares equilibrium simultaneous and sequential interpersonal
20Among other di¤erences, in their group-buying mechanisms consumers have heterogenous valuations
but identical participation costs, whereas in our model high-value consumers di¤er in participation costs but
have identical valuation.
21Under these values of H there exist interior solutions of optimal m under both formats, while if H = 2:5
or H = 2 this is not ensured.
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bundles, denoted with superscripts  and ; respectively.
Table 4
Simultaneous Format Sequential Format
H
1:6
1:5
1:4
p q m t  p q m t 
1:6 1 0:97 0:44 2:335 1:6 1 0:96 0:6 2: 272
1:5 1 0:80 0:40 2: 300 1:5 1 0:75 0:5 2: 26 6
1:4 1 0:62 0:35 2: 262 1:4 1 0:56 0:4 2: 246
Example 4 makes it clear that a prot-maximizing seller may prefer the simultaneous
over the sequential format. This is because the seller wishes to price discriminate when
using interpersonal bundling, and, unlike the sequential format, the simultaneous format
does not remove uncertainty for the high-value consumers, thereby discouraging them from
signing up to obtain the group discount.
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS
This paper has conducted a strategic analysis of interpersonal bundling. As a form of
option pricing under demand uncertainty, this selling strategy can be optimal among all
selling mechanisms that may depend on realized aggregate demand, and its protability is
illustrated neatly in a general bundling framework. The prot advantage of interpersonal
bundling (relative to separate selling) tends to be an inverted-U function of the valuation
ratio of high vs. low-value consumers (H=L), maximized when the ratio is some intermediate
value; and the prot advantage is more profound when the number of low-value consumers
has a more dispersed distribution. Moreover, the protability of this selling strategy will
be enhanced if the incentive to qualify for group purchase motivates buyers to disseminate
product information, and if more high-value consumers can be induced to pay the regular
instead of the discounted price.
While interpersonal bundling is often a protable selling strategy, our analysis also reveals
that it is not always more protable than separate selling, even if no additional selling cost
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is required. Moreover, like other selling formats, interpersonal bundling can achieve its
potential benets for the seller only if it is properly implemented. In particular, losses
may occur if the bundle discount under group purchase is too big. For example, when a
restaurant o¤ers a group coupon for 70% o¤ its regular price, it could be unwisely pricing
below marginal cost.22 While many businesses have proted from o¤ering interpersonal
bundling on the Internet, there have also been media reports about how a merchant is hurt
by its deep group discount through Groupon and other social buying intermediaries.23
Part of the problem is a potential conict in incentives: even though the seller should use
the advertised deal to maximize its prot, an intermediary like Groupon benets from a
higher deal success rate. However, it need not be in the best interests of the sellers (and,
in the long run, also their Internet intermediaries such as Groupon) to focus only on deal
success rates. As our theory suggests, the sellers prot is sometimes higher when the deal
is o¤   if the realized number of low-value consumers is not high.24 And, it would be
even worse for sellers if below-cost group sale prices are used to boost deal success rates.25
We have studied monopoly interpersonal bundling in this paper. It would be desirable for
22The restaurant may want to attract repeat customers by taking a one-time loss, but is the loss necessary?
Our analysis suggests that interpersonal bundling can be protable without the repeat-business e¤ect, and
a seller need not incur losses in order to generate repeat businesses.
23See, for example, Groupon demand almost nishes cupcake-maker (November 22, 2011, The Tele-
graph), which tells the story of a British cakemaker who o¤ered her product at 75% o¤ its regular price
through Groupon and had to produce at costs substantially above price in order to meet a huge demand
increase. See also Byers, Mitzenmacher and Zervas (2012) for discussions about negative side e¤ects for
merchants using Groupon.
24As a form of advertising, interpersonal bundling on the Internet can also serve as a promotional device
that encourages consumers to try the product and become repeat customers. While we do not model such
roles, they can also be important. Indeed, some sellers may have used Groupon as an advertising platform
to attract repeat customers, or to ll up their o¤-peak capacity.
25According to a survey reported in Groupon hurt by lack of repeat biz(January 4, 2012, The New York
Post), although 8 out of 10 merchants who ran a daily group coupon deal were satised with the results, 52
percent of those surveyed were not planning to run a daily deal in the next six months. The article states
that [Groupon] has been accused of coercing businesses to basically give away goods and services while it
takes its up to 50 percent cut."
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future research to analyze interpersonal bundling by competing rms. The protability of
this selling strategy, and its potential adoption by a rm, may then depend on competitive
conditions, possibly also including considerations such as product di¤erentiation. It could
also be interesting to extend our analysis to markets with more complex uncertain demand,
where rms may use more general nonlinear pricing schemes.
APPENDIX
The appendix contains proofs for Corollary 2, Proposition 3, and Proposition 4.
Proof of Corollary 2. From (i), Hy  L  y + xF^  : Hence under separate selling the
optimal price is H for either F^ or F: It follows that
^   ^s =
Z Z
x+ym^
[L (x+ y) Hy] dF^ (x) dJ (y) +Hy  Hy

Z by
ay
(Z b^x
m y
[Lx  (H   L) y] dF^ (x)
)
dJ (y) ;
where the inequality is due to revealed preference. Since F^ (x) < F (x) for x  m  y from
(ii), we haveZ b^x
m y
[Lx  (H   L) y] dF^ (x)
=
h
Lb^x   (H   L) y
i
  [Lm  Hy] F^ (m   y) 
Z bx
m y
LF^ (x) dx 
Z b^x
bx
LF^ (x) dx
> [Lbx   (H   L) y]  [Lm  Hy] F^ (m   y) 
Z bx
m y
LF (x) dx:
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Thus
^   ^s >
Z by
ay
[Lbx   (H   L) y] dJ (y) 
Z by
ay
[Lm  Hy] ~F (m   y) dJ (y)
 
Z by
ay
Z bx
m y
LF (x) dxdJ (y) :
(from (iii)) 
Z by
ay
[Lbx   (H   L) y] dJ (y) 
Z by
ay
[Lm  Hy]F (m   y) dJ (y)
 
Z by
ay
Z bx
m y
LF (x) dxdJ (y)
=
Z bx
m y
[Lx  (H   L) y] dF (x) =    s:
Proof of Proposition 3. We consider in turn two cases:
Case 1: 1 < a  p2 + 1: Then s = (a+1)28 =  (p; q; 0) with q = a+14 < 1 < p < a:
Notice that
@ (p; q;m)
@m

m=0; q=a+1
4
; 1<p<a
=
1
2 (1  q) (a  p) p > 0:
Therefore starting from separate selling at ps = a+14 ; introducing interpersonal bundling
with q = a+14 < 1 < p < a and m > 0 leads to a higher prot than 
s:
Case 2: a >
p
2 + 1: We argue that in this case  > s if
p
2 + 1 < a <
p
3 + 1; and
 = s if a  p3 + 1:
First, notice that s = a
2
4 =  (p; q;m) with p =
a
2 ; q < 1 and m = a + 2   3q; and,
for interpersonal bundling to have a higher prot than separate selling, it is necessary that
q < 1 < p and a  q < m < a+ 2  3q: Next, since
@ (p; q;m)
@p
=  (2p  a) (m  a+ q)
2 (1  q) ;
the optimal p satises p = a=2: Furthermore, since @(p;q;m)@m =  mq ap+p
2
2(1 q) and
@2(p;q;m)
@m2
<
0;  > s if and only if  (a=2; q;m) is decreasing inm atm = a+2 3q for some q 2 (0; 1) :
Finally,
 
 
mq   ap+ p2
2 (1  q)

m=a+2 3q; p=a
2
=
a2   4aq   8q + 12q2
8 (1  q) < 0
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if and only if both a <
p
3 + 1 and
q 2 (1
3
+
a
6
 
p
2
6
p
2a  a2 + 2; 1
3
+
a
6
+
p
2
6
p
2a  a2 + 2)  
 (a) ;
where 
 (a) is an interval on [0:5; 1) when a <
p
3 + 1: We conclude that  > s if and
only if 1 < a <
p
3 + 1.
Proof of Proposition 4. First, in equilibrium, ~  ~ (p; q;m) satises @U

jm; ~

=@

=~
=
0; or
(p  q) [F (m  n)  F (m  n  k)]

1  ~
n 1   C 0 ~ = 0: (17)
The rms problem is:
max
qL<pH;m
 (p; q;m) (18)
= q
h
1 

1  ~
ni Z
xm n k
(x+ n+ k) dF (x) +

1  ~
n Z
xm n
(x+ n) dF (x)

+p
hh
1 

1  ~
ni
(n+ k)F (m  n  k) +

1  ~
n
nF (m  n)
i
:
Next, from (17) and with C 00  0; we have ~  ~ (p; q;m) increasing in p and decreasing
in q; and furthermore
@~ (p; q;m)
@m
=
(p  q) [f (m  n)  f (m  n  k)]

1  ~
n 1
(n  1) (p  q) [F (m  n)  F (m  n  k)]

1  ~
n 2
+ C 00
:
Thus ~ (p; q;m) is increasing in m at m = n + ax but decreasing in m at m = n + k + bx:
At the optimum,  (p; q;m) must increase in ~: Thus, since  (p; q;m) and ~ (p; q;m) both
increase in p; the solution to problem (18) must have p = H; so that problem (18) becomes
maxqL;m  (H; q;m) :
Next,
@ (H; q;m)
@~
= qn

1  ~
n 1 Z
xm n k
(x+ n+ k) dF (x) 
Z
xm n
(x+ n) dF (x)

+Hn

1  ~
n 1
[(n+ k)F (m  n  k)  nF (m  n)] ;
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with
@ (p; q;m)
@~

m=n+ax
= qn

1  ~
n 1
k > 0;
@ (p; q;m)
@~

m=n+k+bx
= Hn

1  ~
n 1
k > 0:
Next, since Hn  L (n+ ax) by assumption (A2),
@ (H; q;m)
@m

m=n+ax
=
h
1 

1  ~
ni
[H (n+ k)  qm] f (m  n  k)

m=n+ax
+

1  ~
n
(Hn  qm) f (m  n)

m=n+ax
+
@ (p; q;m)
@~
@~ (p; q;m)
@m

m=n+ax
 @ (p; q;m)
@~

m=n+ax
@ (p; q;m)
@~

m=n+k+bx
> 0:
On the other hand; atm = n+k+bx;
@(p;q;m)
@~
@~(p;q;m)
@m < 0; f (m  n) = 0; f (m  n  k) >
0; ~ is not a¤ected by q from (17), but  (H; q;m) increases in q; which implies that q = L
at m = n+ k + bx: And since H (n+ k)  L (n+ k + bx) by assumption (A2); we have
@ (H; q;m)
@m

m=n+k+bx
< 0:
Therefore, the equilibrium m is interior: m 2 (n+ ax; n+ k + bx) : It follows from (17)
that  > 0:
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